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SECURITIES REGULATIONS - FRAUD - BROKER'S USE OF "INSIDER" INFORMATION WITHOUT DISCLOSURE HELD VIOLATION OF

SEA.- Respondent was a selling broker and partner in a firm
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The firm
employed a registered representative who was also a director of
Curtiss-Wright Corporation. The board of directors of CurtissWright approved a reduction in the company's last quarterly
dividend, but before this information became public respondent
learned of the board's action through the representative-director
who supplied the information without knowledge that it had not
been published. Respondent immediately entered sell orders on
behalf of a number of the firm's clients, without disclosing the
impending dividend reduction. In proceedings to determine whether
the anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts had been violated,
the Commission held that respondent had breached the duty of
disclosure incorporated in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 17(a) of the Securities Act and Rule X-10B-5 of
the Commission. In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., CCH FED.

176803 (November 8, 1961).
Fraudulent practices resorted to in the purchase and sale of

SEC. L. REP. (2d ed.)

corporate securities give rise to a common-law action for deceit.'
However, as in any common-law fraud action, it is necessary in
order to establish liability to prove: conscious misrepresentation of

a material fact; that it was made to induce reliance by plaintiff;2
that there was an actual reliance; and, consequent damage.
Where a fraud action is based on a failure to make known certain
facts, as opposed to active misrepresentation, a defendant's liability
is contingent upon the existence of a duty of disclosure arising
from the specific relationship of the parties or other extrinsic3
factors sufficient to require a high degree of candor and frankness.
Where such a duty of disclosure does not exist, and in the absence
will fall within the
of positive misrepresentation, a transaction
4
scope of the doctrine of caveat emptor.
The application of these common-law principles to corporate
insiders has not been uniform. A majority of jurisdictions have
taken the position that the fiduciary duty of insiders is owed
to the corporate entity as a whole, as opposed to individual shareholders, with the result that in these states directors and controlling
shareholders may purchase and sell to minority holders without
making any disclosure of "inside" information. 5 Some jurisdictions,

' See Loss,
2 Id. at 813.
3
Id. at 816.
4 Ibid.
5 See Note,
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812-23 (1951).

L. REv. 429, 430 (1951).
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on the other hand, have adopted the view that the basic responsibilities of corporate fiduciaries are owed to the shareholders as
such, so that an insider who exploits confidential corporate information in dealing with shareholders of the corporation is guilty
of a breach of trust.6 A third approach, although concurring in the
majority attitude regarding the fiduciary obligations of insiders,
imposes a duty of disclosure in situations involving "special
circumstances." 7
Federal statutory provisions relating to fraud in securities
transactions are embodied in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19348 and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933,' both of which contain general prohibitions against the
use of fraudulent practices. Section 10(b) is phrased in terms
section
of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance";
10
refer to
17(a) and rule X-10B-5 promulgated by the SEC,
"any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" and "fraud or deceit
upon any person." Whether or not under any particular circumstances there exists a statutory duty of disclosure must be
determined from this broad language.
Pursuant to these sections, the courts have required disclosure
by corporate insiders dealing with minority shareholders 11 and by
stockbrokers in transactions with or on behalf of clients. 12 With
regard to the former, the so-called "minority" common-law view
seems to have been read into the securities laws. Thus, for
example, it was stated in Speed v. Transamerica Corp.: "The duty
of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a corporate
insider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the
uninformed minority stockholders." 13 In the broker cases the
courts have based their conclusion on the fiduciary relationship
6 Ibid.

7Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). See also Note, supra note 5,
at 430-31.
8
Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 48 Stat 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (b) (1958). Section 10(b) applies where there is "use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange. . . ." Ibid.
9Securities Act § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77q(a) (1958).
The provisions of this section regulate the sale of securities "in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly....." Ibid.
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10B-5 (1949).
11 See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del.
1951) ; Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
See Comment, 32 TFXAs L. REV. 198, 200 (1953).
12 See, e.g., Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1956); Hawkins
v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104, 122 (W.D.
Ark. 1949). In the present proceeding the transaction involved was entered
into on behalf of clients but there was no element of self-gain as in the
above cases.
ja Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
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of trust
and confidence which exists between a broker and his
14

client.

In the proceeding under discussion, the SEC took up the
question of whether the statutory duty of disclosure under 10(b)
and 17(a) extends beyond these groups and concluded that it does.
The finding of the Commission was based mainly on two grounds:
[1] "the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone," 15 and
[2] "the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing." 16
The view adopted seems to be that there is a basic unfairness
in the use by one party, to the disadvantage of another, of corporate information never intended for the private gain of individuals.
Whereas the common law would look to some fiduciary relationship
in ascertaining the existence of a duty of disclosure, the Commission
apparently conceives of a statutory duty of disclosure inherent in
"inside" corporate information as such, the use of which by any
individual, without disclosure, is presumptively tortious.
In addition, the ruling suggests that respondent, under the
facts presented, could be held to have violated common-law principles. Despite the fact that such a conclusion was not necessary
to the final result, some reliance was placed on this approach as
added support for the actual holding. At common law, complicity
by a third party in the breach of a fiduciary's duty renders the
third party liable to the fiduciary's beneficiary. The Commission presupposes the existence of a duty of disclosure on the part of the firm's
representative-director. Although it is not made clear to whom
such duty was owed, the public in general would seem, from the
opinion as a whole, the most logical choice. According to this
reasoning, respondent, in making use of inside corporate information without disclosure, cooperated in a breach of the director's duty
to the public. The use of this information by respondent with
knowledge that it had not been released to the public apparently
was considered by the Commission as constituting "complicity,"
despite the fact that the representative-director concededly acted in
complete good faith
and may not himself have been guilty of any
7
breach of trust.'

14 See Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 231 (D.C. Cir.
1949); Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
15 In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. (2d

ed.)

76803, at 81017 (November 8, 1961).

16 Ibid.
17Ibid. See

RFSTATEMm:NT,

RESTITUTION

§201(2) (1937).

1962 ]

RECENT DECISIONS

In a number of other proceedings described as "analogous"
by the Commission 18 and in which brokers had been subjected to
an obligation of disclosing inside corporate information, the brokers
had acted as agents for insiders with the view of realizing profits
for themselves. 19 In the present matter there was clearly no
such scheme between the accused broker and the insider-director
and no profits were realized by either party. Rather, the broker
had acted to protect the accounts of his clients and merely did,
it was contended, what his obligation of loyalty required. The
Commission took the position that no duty to one's clients
justifies
20
resort to unfair methods in promoting their interests.
It seems clear that the general scope of the fraud provisions
incorporated in the federal securities acts is considerably broader
than common-law concepts of fraud. 2 ' A number of common-law
requirements are dispensed with.22 However, the extent of the
duty of disclosure embodied in these provisions has, as a separate
matter, remained poorly defined. 23 The need for clarification, in
this regard, is accentuated by what, until now, has appeared to
be a limitation of liability for nondisclosure to corporate insiders
and stockbrokers violating some clearly defined duty toward their
clients. It would seem from both the broad statutory terminology
involved, and the tenor of decisions construing it, that the disclosure
requirements of 10(b) and 17(a), if not as broad as the general
scope of the fraud provisions, are at least as extensive as those
existing at common law. But the crucial point to be determined
is to what extent, if any, the federal securities acts go beyond the
common law or, in other words, whether or not they create a
duty of disclosure more imperative than any existing prior to their
enactment. The SEC has decided that they do. The ultimate
answer must be given by Congress or the courts.
18 In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., supra note 15, at 81017.
19 See, e.g., In the Matter of Hughes & Treat, 22 S.E.C. 623 (1946);

In the Matter of R. D. Bayly & Co., 19 S.E.C. 773 (1945); In the Matter
of Hay, 19 S.E.C. 397 (1945).
20 In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., supra note 15, at 81020.
21 See, e.g., Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 233 (D.C.
Cir. 1949); Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, supra
note 12.
-2See Loss, SEcuarI=s REGULATION 818-23 (1951). For example, under
Section 17(a) (1) of the Securities Act it is not necessary for the Commission
to prove actual loss in order to establish fraud. Id. at 819.
23
1n Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1959), the
court held that the duty of disclosure under § 10(b) was no more extensive
than that required by the common law of Ohio. In Tobacco & Allied Stocks
v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323 (D. Del. 1956), Rule X-10B-5 is
referred to as "founded on common-law fraud." Id. at 327. See also Note,
42 VA. L. REv. 537, 554 (1956). The author of this note concludes that
the latter rule merely incorporates common-law disclosure requirements.

